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II is a great honour and privilege to have been asked to give this year's P.leanor Rathbone
lecture at Somerville College. In view of the occasion and the place, it seems particularly
appropriate that March 8th is international women's day. And although Eleanor Ralhbone
was never - to my knowledge - involved in southern African issues, I helieve that had she
been with us now, she would he watching its negotiated settlement, constitutional
developments and moves towards its first democratic non-racial elections with all the attention
she gave to India's struggle for independence. She would certainly have approved of the
number of women on the ANC's electoral lists. At the same time, wilh her passionate
involvement in the Tight against nazism in Europe, she would surely also be appalled by (he
evidence of the resurgence of racism and national chauvinism in our own times and have
found it almost incomprehensible. My own view that it is perhaps one of the mst important
issues facing us at the present time • a view I believe Eleanor Ralhbone would have shared -
has led me to the subject of my lecture this evening.
My choice of topic thus has a much to do with my concern with the history of our own time
and place as it has with South Africa. For too long, South Africa has been a convenient
scapegoat for a west - including a radical and feminist west - unwilling or unable to confront
the ways in which as Catherine Hall has remarked, 'Racism, imperialism, colonialism ... are
issues for white women [and indeed, one might add, white men| in Britain because they have
shaped QUI histories, structured our stories, formed our identities'.1 The spotlight on South
Africa has perhaps often left major aspects of our own society in darkness. Eleanor
Rathbone's indefatigable investigations into and admirable i f at times painful (to a
contemporary feminist) interventions in the position of what she termed 'coloured women of
the empire1, perhaps inevitably limited by the paternalism of her limes, hovers on the brink
of such an understanding.
Let me begin by subverting my own title: every substantive word in it would seem to need
some explanation. Easiest perhaps is South Africa: at least in some of what follows my focus
will be either narrower or wider than its contemporary boundaries -- in that I will be talking
a good deal about the Dutch and British colonies at the Cape on the one hand, and (somewhat
speculatively) about aspects of precolonial African socieiies in southern Africa on the other.
More problematic are the terms non-racism and tradition. To talk about racism is of course
in noway to concede the reality of the category 'race': but as hasofien been pointed out, the
non-scientific status of the category 'in no way undermines its symbolic and social
effeclivity'.1 There is as you will know a huge and controversial literature on race and
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racism, and a growing literalure on "anti-racism" as political movement in this country and
the USA: relatively little on 'non-racism1. The term is being widely used in South Africa
today, especially in relation lo the political (lem;imt Tor a 'non-racial' democratic state. What
is meant by this? A| a common sense level it is of course easy; it is the demand (hat an
individual's citizenship, legal rights, economic entitlements and life-chances should not he
decided on the basis of 'racial ascriptions'. This however simply defers the problem: for
what Ihen is meant by 'race' or racism? Again there is a common-sense answer: the
definition of 'the other' in terms of assumed biological difference. And certainly from the
1840s to the 1940s the hegemony of biology meant lhat physical endowment was 'one of Ihe
principal determinants of attitudes, endowments, capabilities, and inherent tendencies among
1
 human beings. Race thus seemed to determine the course of human history." Ry race was
meant a particular genetic endowment, which predicted not only physical appearance but also
moral character.
The difference between biological 'race' and other modes of boundary drawing is often
believed to be its inescapaniliry. And of course insofar as the distinctions are being based
on perceptible differences such as skin colour they seem even more inescapable - which is
why assimilation has always been an easier option for Jews than for blacks. But while skin
colour difference is in one sense a visible marker - it is not indispensable. As Sander Gilman
has remarked, 'The very concept of color is a quality of Otherness, not of reality. For not
only are blacks black in this amorphous world of projection, so too are Jews', an association
that goes hack to medieval iconography.' Nor should we assume that the differences between
black and white are so clear cut, do not involve a fair amount of imagining. Quite clearly the
terms black and while cover an infinite variety of light and dark skin tones, and Ihe categories
are largely social rather than natural. As Stuart Hall puts it, 'Black is not a question of
pigmentation. The Black I'm talking about is a historical category, a political category, a
cultural category.... Their histories as in the past, are inscribed in their skins." But it is not
\ P. Curtin, Image of Africa (London, 1965), 29. As Curtin points out, these ideas were
not 'pseudo-scientific' in their beginnings: at Ihe time they represented the cutting edge of
science.
* Sander L Gilman, Disease and Representation. Images of Illness from Madness to
AIDS (Ithaca and London, 1988), 30-1. See also his Difference and Pathology: Stereotypes
of Sexuality. Race and Madness (Ithaca,. 1985). Hechler also cites Ihe case of the Irish who
were frequently regarded as racially inferior in the nineteenth century, though the lack of a
colour difference was seen as somewhat puzzling. Charles Kingsley, for example, describing
a visit to western Ireland remarked:
... I am haunted by the human chimpanzees I saw along that hundred miles of
horritile country. I don't believe ihey are our fault. I believe Ihere are not
only many more of Ihem than of old, hut they are happier, better and more
comfortably fed and lodged under our rule than they ever were. But to see
white chimpanzees is dreadful; i f they were black, one would not feel it so
much, but their skins, except where lanned by exposure, are as white as ours
... (Cited in M. Hcchicr, Internal Colonialism. The Celtic fringe in British
national development. 1530-1966 |London, I975[, pxvii).
because of their skins that they are Black in their head1;.' '
Since the 1940s - when the idea of scientific racism was thought to be totally discredited by
the horrifying events of the holocaust - the dominance of biological racism has of course
passed out of fashion, at least in educated circles and in western Europe; there has been a
shift instead into the language of culture. Paul Gilroy has argued, for example - in what, to
my mind is the most interesting and provocative work in the field • that in Britain what he
terms the ' new racism' of the 1960s was distinguished by its capacity to 'link discourses of
patriotism, nationalism, xenophobia, Englishness, Britishness, militarism and gender
difference into a complex system which gives "race" its contemporary meaning.' 'The new
racism' thus 'specifies who may legitimately belong to the national community and
simultaneously advances reasons for the segregation or banishment of those whose origin,
sentiment or citizenship assigns them elsewhere . . . ' Theoretically, of course, it is easier to
challenge exclusion on the grounds of culture than of biology. Yet, as he continues, 'where
culture, or sub-culture is defined as a fixed and impermeable property of human life' the shift
in the balance of explanation for exclusion from biology to culture is a difference 'of degree
rather than any fundamental divergence'.*
Thus, cultural or ethnic essential ism can he almost as difficult to escape as supposed
biological markers; and I would argue that the blurring of these categories is as much a 19th
as a 20th century phenomenon. Indeed, until the 1930s in South Africa the racial question
for whites referred to the conflict between Boer and Briton, while among Africans too, the
word seems to have referred to what we would now term ethnic or tribal difference.
Moreover, until the 1940s and 1950s, and then for a relatively short time, Afrikaners, with
their intellectual roots in neo-Calvinist notions of the divine sovereignty of nations, rarely
used the language of biological inferiority, perhaps because the entire discourse of social
Darwinism was anathema.' And today, in South Africa the discourse of difference has come
to focus again on issues of culture so that racism is not infrequently disguised as a discourse
about local autonomy. So - it turns out, racism is a rather more slippery concept than at it
appears at first sight.
Is the demand for non-racism then a demand for a boundary-less society? Surely not. Nor,
however, is it a purely formalist call for'equal rights', although this is clearly the minimalist
demand: necessary if not sufficient. There is - at least at top levels of the ANC - a
recognition that a non-racial democratic society in South Africa will have to defend people's
' Stuart Hall was talking of the category of 'Black' in contemporary Britain and the fact
that no-one described themselves as 'Black' in the Jamaica of his childhood: 'Old and New
Identities, Old and New Ethnicities', in A. King, ed. Culture, Globalization and the World
System (Basingstoke, 1991), 53.
* P. Gilroy, There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack (London, 1987), 31-4, 45.
' Saul Dubow, 'Afrikaner nationalism, apartheid and the conceptualization of "race".
Journal pf African History, vol. 33 (1992) 209.
rights to be Ihe same ami their right to be different, as Albie Sachs has put it.' This is not,
after all, a particularly Utopian demand: most of us do combine multiple identities which
have salience in different contexts, and are perfectly comfortable with our hybridity. And
we do expect to have certain basic human rights in common. Ultimately, then, I understand
the politics of non-racism lo be anti-essenlialist politics, Ihe politics of both/and rather than
either/or which black writers like Stuart Hall and Paul Gilroy have been calling for in this
country in response to the limitations of anti-racism and multi-culiuralism.*
And this is particularly important fur South Africa if the environment of political tolerance,
so necessary not only for the establishment of democracy, is to be established, hut also if the
anarchic violence that threatens alt basic human rights in the Republic is to be reduced. This
surely is the necessary first step if the years of dispossession, deprivation, discrimination and
social dislocation are to be overcome and basic needs for food and shelter, health care and
education, axe to be addressed.
So much for racism and 'non-racism*. What about 'tradition'? Again let me start wjih a
disclaimer: by tradition I do not mean the transmission of a body of statements, beliefs, rules
and customs from generation to generation' as the Shorter Oxford Dictionary would have it;
tradition - as we know from Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger's wonderful The lnven.tinn
of Tradition is very often remarkably recent.1"
Nor do I share the optimism of Julie Frederikse who describes 'non-racialism' as 'the most
pervasive and enduring ideological tendency in South African history'. Based on a clutch of
rather selective documents and interviews with 'veterans of the liberation struggle', her
recent book on the subject has the splendidly sanguine title The Unbreakable Thread." It
seems to me that there has not been one thread or tradition of non-racism in South Africa,
but several; and that they weave themselves in and out of the ever changing tapestry of social
thought and practice. Nor alas is it 'unbreakable'- s it not simply - as one of Frederikse's
1
 See for example his 'Preparing for Freedom', Wfiekjy Mail, 2 Feb 1990.
* Cf Gilroy, 'We need to be theoretically and politically clear that no single culture is
hermetically sealed off from others. There can be no neat and tidy pluralistic separation of
racial groups in this country. It is time to dispute with those positions which, when take to
their conclusions, say "There is no possibility of shared history and no human empathy." We
must beware of the use of ethnicity to wrap a spurious cloak of legitimacy around Ihe speaker
who invokes it. Culture, even the culture which defines groups as races, is never fixed,
finished or final....' Paul Gilroy, 'The end of anti-racism' in Donald and Rattansi, Race..
Culture. Difference, 57.
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informants puts it - thai the thread 'wears thin' on occasion1." As in a tapestry, the threads
cannol always be seen continuously; they are often broken; they change colour in different
lights and contexts; and their texture is equally variable, as we shall see. Nor should this
surprise us. Recent thinking about 'tradition', culture, identity has emphasized its
contingency • and this is true whether the tradition, culture, identity are coastituted around
'race"; its opposite - 'anti-racism'; or its negative - 'non-racism'. Culture, race, identity are
all historically constituted, socially constructed and politically contested. Even in the sense
of 'invention' then there is no .single 'tradition' of 'non-racism' in South Africa, not least
because racism itself is not homogenous; thus we need to be talking about traditions and non-
racisms.
Even if one discounts the somewhat triumphalist views of Julie Frederikse, however, there
is surely an irony in the fact that at a time of heightened racism and anii-semitism in Europe,
South Africa, so long the world's pariah for its practice of apartheid, the systematic exclusion
of the majority of its inhabitants from citizenship on the grounds of'race', is about to contest
an election on 27th April in which no major party openly espouses racism. Of course we
should not be too sanguine about this: non-racism is always a fragile plant and it could easily
be destroyed by the winds that blow in a rapidly changing society with scarce resources, and
people hide racism behind alternative discourses. Nevertheless, the paradox remains and
remains to be explained.
This is perhaps no surprise in the case of the A NC where the commitment to non-racism has
an honourable history, even if it is more recent than Frederikse allows, and may be less than
widespread beyond leadership levels. Nevertheless, it is important that such its explicit
avowal of non-racism has not stood in the way of the ANC's popularity, and that its list of
parliamentary candidates contains over sixty whites, coloureds and Indians: the ANC is likely
to win a handsome majority, drawing its support from all sectors of the populace - although
its non-racism may find it difficult to survive beyond the first election. Only the at-present
small Pan Africanist Congress (AZAPO) with its somewhat chilling slogan, 'One settler, one
bullet' has openly adopted a racist platform - and even that is contested within the ranks of
its leadership. Remarkably, given the populism of its message it is believed to have the
support of less than 10 per cent - perhaps no more than 5 per cent - of the black population.
The Inkatha Freedom Party - established by the Zulu Cultural movement. Inkatha ya haka
Zulu which was founded to mobilise and promote Zulu ethnic nationalism has three white
members of parliament and may now be supported by more whites than Zulu-speakers;
President Mangope in Bophulhatswana is similarly sustained in his opposition to the post-
apartheid constitution by white farmers in the western Transvaal, while far-right Afrikaners
agitating for a white 'Volkstaat' do so in the name of Christianity, civilisation and cultural
" Tony Halliday, cited in Frederickse, Unbreakable Thread. 121. Although it is slightly
ambiguous, to be fair Halliday was probably talking about the thread of ANC resistance after
the Rivonia trial rather than non-racism per se.
survival - in alliance with Chiefs. Buthelezi and Mangope." The National Party founded to
promote Afrikaner supremacy - and which for a lung lime excluded Jews and English-
speakers from its membership - today courts black members, and is set to win a substantial
share of the Coloured vote in the Cape and the Indian vole in Natal. As I understand it, that
vanguard of Afrikaner ethnic mobilisation, the Broederbond - Band of Brothers - has recently
agreed to include black brothers in its ranks hul no sisters - regardless of the colour of their
skins. Political interest has quite dramatically overshadowed any atavistic call of the blood.
How is it that in a country so long notorious for its racism even the far-right are being forced
into if not non-racial, at least cross-racial, alliances? What lies behind the ANC espousal
of non-racism - despite, one would have thought, the easy gain to he made from a more
populist appeal to racial or ethnic emotion? And are there wider lessons to be learnt from
this?
Part of the answer to these questions is of course to be found in pragmatic political
calculations. Racism in South Africa has itself always been more pragmatic than the outside
media which focuses on the antics of the far-right would have us believe. And cross-racial
alliances, whether bom of a common oppression or of self-interest - or a calculated
combination of the two, go back in South African history almost as far as the much-cited
thorn hedge its founding figure, Jan van Riebeeck, allegedly planted across the peninsula to
keep the small Dutch East India settlement and the local Khoisan people apart. The hedge was
ineffectual, but as early as 1659 15 slaves, 4 Englishmen, 4 Scotsmen, 3 Dutch Company
servants, and a black convict plotted to escape the Company's stern rule by sea."
In the late eighteenth/early nineteenth century white frontiersmen - such as the de Buyses,
Prinsloos and Bezuidenhouts - attempted on more than one occasion to persuade the Xhosa
chiefs on the Cape's eastern frontier to join them in driving out the newly arrived British.
Poor if not landless, these were the families who had the most to fear from the extension of
imperial law and order, and the encroachment of modernity represented by the new
government officials on the frontier, whether sent by the Dutch East India Company, the
short-lived Batavian Republic or the British who replaced them at the turn of the nineteenth
century Cape.
Of these, the larger than life Coenraad de Buys is perhaps a fitting anti-hero for our time. As
Noel Mostert describes him;
" Since this lecture was delivered, Mangope has in fact been ousted by the black populace
of Bophuthatswana, and his white right-wing support clearly revealed - and discredited. The
importance of white right-wing support for Buthelezi - most importantly from within military
intelligence and the police - has also been accepted by the Goldstone Commission, appointed
by the government to enquire into the origins of political violence in South Africa.
'* I am grateful to Stanley Trapido for this example, and for much that follows. See his
unpublished paper, "The Cape Dutch and the Problems of Colonial Identity', Institute of
Commonwealth Studies, postgraduate seminar on the Societies of Southern Africa, 25
February, 1994. As he points out, one of the Englishmen was 'Pieter Barber of Hamstede\
one of the Scots,'Patricq f lock of Glasco"!
Government outlawed and hunted him, and alternatively waived pardons; it
never controlled him, any more than did the conventions of the society from
which he came. ... the de Buys family ... were of a blood mixture uniquely
composed of every possible strain, de Buys, paterfamilias had never married
a white women. The children of his various wives, mixed blood |sic| and
black, married across all the colour lines. The virility of the progenitor thus
initiated every possible mutation from bloodlines crossed and recrossed, to
produce a clan that wove his own Huguenot blood through every shade of the
indigenous spectrum."
Ultimately de Buys moved heyond the confines of the Cape Colony, gun-running to African
peoples, and frequently living under their chiefs and marrying their women, to establish
himself as the first Afrikaner in the Transvaal. To cement an alliance against the British, de
Buys is said - in truly African fashion - to have offered his fifteen year-old daughter to the
Xhosa chief Ngqika in marriage in 1799 ... while de Buys himself is said to have lived for
several years with Ngqika's mother. '*
Despite his reputation, in 1795 de Buys led his fellow Boers in forming the short-lived Graaff
Reinet Republic; de Buys also married 'Elizabeth' 'geboren in het land v.d. Makinas ochter
de Tamboekies' (bom in the land of the Bakwena beyond the Thembu') i.e. a Kwena - or
southern Sotho - women, and gave evidence against one of his neighbours in the 'Black
Circuit" of 1812." de Buys - perhaps not surprisingly - has never been accommodated
witfiin a later Afrikaner nationalist iconography. On the other hand, Frederick Cornelius
Bezuidenhout, who pursued a similar life-style and also attempted to raise Boer-Xhosa
alliances, and who was hanged in somewhat grisly circumstances for defying British orders
on how to treat his 'servants' and for raising rebellion at Slagter's Nek, was by the late
nineteenth century being cast as an early martyr in the nationalist cause.
Paradoxically these men who were the source of so much violence on the frontier in some
ways established the most intimate relationships with Africans; they were also those who had
15
 Frontiers. The epic, of South Africa's creation and the tragedy of Mig Xhosa people
(London, 1992), 611-2. Clearly fascinated by de Buys, Mostert's extraordinarily rich account
of the Cape eastern frontier has perhaps the fullest historical account of his doings.
Unfortunately it is not adequately annotated and on occasion is difficult to verify.
Nonetheless, Mostert captures the mixture of brutality and intimacy of the Boer frontiersmen
extraordinarily well.
" J. Peires, The House of Phalo. A history of the Xhosa people in the days of their
independence (California, 1982), 54; Mostert, Frontiers, 368 for the daughter. According
to Mostert (272-3), de Buys 'married' the Xhosa Queen Mother, then a widow: while many
accounts allege that he formed a liaison with her, it is unclear what 'marriage' means in this
context.
" Roger Wagner, 'Coenraad de Buys in Transorangia' in Collected Seminar Papers no
17, The Societies of Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries, vol.4 (Institute of
Commonwealth Studies, London, 1973), p.2.
the most to fear from (he encroachment of the stale on the existing order/ disorder. This is
being repeated in contemporary alliances, and has its parallels in Charles van Onselen 's
luminous study of a black sharecropper, Kas Maine, who lived in the south-western
Transvaal, heartland of today's far-right. Van Onselen argues that, contrary to existing
interpretations, in the first half of the twentieth century 'the behaviour of significant numbers
of blacks and whites on the piatteland often transcended the stark and restrictive code of race
relations as it is generally understood and reached a surprising measure of accommodation
in a sadly divided society'. He calls this process 'cultural osmosis between landlords,
sharecroppers and bywoners, which, in turn, advanced notions of social equality in the
countryside'. " This did not stop these very same white farmers from being amongst the
most strident advocates of rigid segregation in the 1940s. In their rejection of the new
'rational' state and of modernity with all its ruptures and dislocations, both van Onselen's
farmers - and the Cape frontiersmen - are perhaps the true progenitors of today's far-right
in alliance with Inkatha. Like Eugene Terreblanche's Afrikaner Weerstand Beweging
(Afrikaner Resistance Movement) and the hostel-dwellers of Inkatha flourishing their cultural
weapons, they present discomforting 'challenges to western visions of modernity'.
Bezuidenhout and Buys are not usually considered part of South Africa's non-racial tradition,
and 1 grant you their record is shot through with contradiction. These - like their latter-day
successors - were brutal men living in brutal times. Intermarriage, let alone sexual relations
across the colour line, do not necessarily betoken relations of equality. I certainly do not
wish to glorify or romanticise the tradition they left behind, or to suggest frontier society
was non-racist, although I do want to use these examples to highlight the complexities of
group identities and 'race relations' on the frontier in the 18th and early 19th century Cape.
Part of that complexity has also to do with the responses of African peoples in their initial
encounter with this vanguard of European expansion, African responses to the 'other'. As
Martin Legassick pointed out a long time ago, the frontier was a zone of mutual acculturation
- in part perhaps because it was on the margins of the state, in which there was no single
legitimate authority." Frontier zones of this kind, however, long predated the advent of
Europeans in southern Africa: they go back to the very origins of southern African societies
in the encounters between the first farmers and herders and the earlier hunter-gatherer peoples
of the region some two thousand years ago.
''; 6
ft i'f\'
As the new culture spread and larger, more successful farming communities werKestablished.
in many areas the new way of life was adopted by Ihe sparser hunter -gathereniitafhus, even
in Ihe apparently inhospitable and isolated Kalahari desert it is now clear thai there was
intense interaction and exchange between hunter-gatherers and food-producers and the
11
 'Race and class in the South African countryside', American Historical Review, vol.95,
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'* M. Legassick, 'The frontier tradition in South African historiography*, in S. Marks and
A. Atmore, Economy and Society jn_JEreco|onia1 South Africa (London and New York,
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development of complex amalgams of agro-pastoralism and pastro-foraging.™ Who absorbed
whom is a moot question: the contemporary Bantu-speaking peoples of southern Africa share
the majority of their genes with the Late Slune Age people of Africa; their close relationship
is also clear from the presence of "click" sounds and loanwords from the Khoisan languages
in South Eastern Bantu and from the iron and stone tools, caiile and wild animal banes,
pottery and ostrich shell heads on many early farming sites. The relationships established
between hunters and herders and later agriculturalists over some 2000 years of social and
economic change seem to have ranged from total resistance to total assimilation. These were
not necessarily relations of equality, but they did leave the way open for mutual
accommodation and acculturation. It is not only in the modern world that 'distinctions are
(constantly) being destroyed ami created'."
Given the nature of the evidence it is difficult to talk with precision about how these
relationships were forged. A recent hook by Fritz Kramer on African perceptions of
'strangers' is, however enormously suggestive, though I am somewhat wary of its ahistorical
character. Kramer looks at the distinctions made by a variety of people between what the
Greeks termed xenos -' who would he allowed residential, land and in some societies civic
rights; and harbaros - 'who do 'not share the attributes of culture, language or of being
human' and who could therefore denied basic human rights and be enslaved or forcibly
incorporated through modes of adoption. He argues, however, that "this scheme of
contrasting the culturally identical stranger with the apparently uncultured barbarian ... by
no means defines the ethnic categories of all African societies, The alternative pattern ... is
based' he says 'not on the criterion of being human, nor on the similarity or dissimilarity of
language and customs, but rather on the rules of exogamy: here a foreigner is anyone whose
sisters and daughters one may marry. Whereas the one scheme of excluding the other form
the politico-jural system justifies adoption and enslavement, here it legitimates marriage.'"
The end results of the two systems are very different: in the first case it produces
heterogenous and stratified societies; in the second far more homogeneous communities.
There is an ahistorical and schematic element in Kramer's arguments which leads me to be
cautious. Nevertheless, interestingly enough one can find both patterns among the African
population of South Africa: among the endogamous Tswana people (who .straddle the
Republic and Botswana) membership of political units was defined not so much by birth as
by allegiance to a chief. In the 19th and early 20th century every such chiefdom contained
communities |... meratshwana or 'little tribes') as well as individuals who had broken away
from their parent 'tribe' and sought refuge or had been absorbed into the chiefdom through
" See, for example, J Denhow, 'Congo to Kalahari: data and hypotheses about the
political economy of the western stream of the Early Iron Age', in The African
Archaeological Review 8 (1990) and E. N. Wilmsen, Land Filled with Flies A political
economy of the Kalahari (Chicago and London, 1989).
" See James Clifford, The Predicament of Culture, Twentieth-century ethnography.
literature, and art (Cambridge, Mass, 1988); the phrase is on p. 17.
" F Kramer, The Red Feg. Art and spirit possession in Africa (London and New York,
1993).
conquest or voluntary submission. These communities and individuals frequently retained
• their own customs and dialectical differences. According to Isaac Schapera, the doyen of
South African anthropologists nf the Tswana, writing in the 1930s and 1940s, 'The general
rule is (hat a group of strangers coming together are, if sufficiently numerous, recognised as
a separate ward by themselves, with their leader as headman." They were granted land and
full civic rights, hut generally had less political influence than 'tribesmen of long-established
slock', although these distinctions disappeared over time.
One should not romanticise this absorptive capacity, however. In addition to various Sotho-
Tswana groupings, each chiefdom also contained people of wholly different origins - the so-
called Sarwa or Kgalagadi, who formed an impoverished underclass of hereditary servants,
probably created in the course of the 18th and I9lh centuries. Historically, then while there
was a real tension within these polities between egalitarianism and inequality, their internal
structure made it 'equally easy for two or more communities to merge, or for a centralised
polity to absorb immigrants and captives', but in ranked and discrete fashion. When the first
white missionaries and traders appeared in the interior at a time of great turmoil, it is then
perhaps not surprising that as the Comaroffs have remarked, they were also quickly
categorised as 'other': Setswana ways and Sekgoa (European ways) came to be 'constructed
in opposition to one another ' - 'each with its own cosmology, "customs" and conventions."
Among the Xhosa-speaJting people on the south-east coast the process seems to have been
somewhat different. Far less hierarchically structured, the Xhosa too had a long history of
absorbing and incorporating captives and refugee communities. But the Xhosa were
exogamous: as among the Tswana people who lived outside the range of Xhosa social
relations were regarded as outside of the moral community - but this social distance could be
reduced by marriage, or through the incorporation of aliens into the Xhosa nation, where,
according to the historian, Jeff Peires, they 'would become bound and protected by Xhosa
law and customs'. This had indeed happened for more than a thousand years on the
'frontiers* between Bantu-speakers and Khoisan, as we have already seen. Thus when the
Xhosa encountered Europeans in the contested area of the eastern frontier, according to
Peires, they
saw no reason why Xhosa and European should not merge into a single society
rather after the pattern of Xhosa and Khoi. They sought to include the Colony
within their economic, political and social networks. They traded with the
Boers as they did with other natioas. Poor Xhosa wishing to acquire cattle for
rich Boers, as they would have done for rich Xhosa. Politically Xhttsa chiefs
saw the Boers as potential allies or enemies, and they offered to help them in
turn against the San and the English.'4
Indeed, as we have seen, Ngqika even hoped to marry Coenraad Buys's daughter as a means
of cementing their alliance.
" Jean and John Comaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution. Christianity. Colonialism and
Consciousness in South Africa vol. I (Chicago and London, 1991) 194, et passim.
M
 House nf Phalo. 53-4.
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It does not seem wholly fanciful to me to suggest that it is in these very different ways of
relating to 'strangers' - in the fluidity of Ihese boundaries and the possibilities lhal existed for
erasing them - that another of the 'threads' in my tapestry is to be found. Of course, at the
time these expectations were to be frustrated, especially once British troops appeared on the
Cape's eastern frontier in 1811, and the Xhosa loo were to learn to distinguish between
'Xhosa ways' and 'white men's ways'. And ironically, it was precisely through what has
often been seen as 'the unbroken thread' reaching from that time lo this that they were to
learn both the possibilities and the limitations of creating a single society: Christian mission
and what the ComarofTs call 'the post-enlightenment process of colonization in which Europe
set out to grasp and subdue the forces of savagery, otherness and unreason.'"
The en!ightenmentypost-enlightenment has suffered a number of hard knocks recently. As
a number of writers from Fanon onwards have argued, for the colonial world the legacy of
the Enlightenment was itself profoundly contradictory, and these ambiguities lie at the heart
of the Cape liberal tradition. Clifton Crais has written recently of the Janus-face' of British
liberalism at the Cape: side by side with 'ideologies and practices that allowed for a
celebration of possessive individualism, political equality and a non-racial representative
government on the hand, and, on the other the dispossession of innumerable communities,
the extension of empire, and the creation of a range of disciplinary institutions and practices
premised on the necessity of surveillance'. It was a 'world which spoke of freedom and at
the same time invented race."* Clearly these generalisations do not cover the earliest
missionaries to the indigenous peoples of the Cape, Willem van der Kemp and James Read -
both of whom scandalised the local populace and many of their missionary brethren by
marring black women, and were fearless protagonists of Khoisan rights; nevertheless, by the
1820s missionaries who demanded the abolition of slavery had, at the same time, constructed
an image of the 'savage' which justified the latter's conversion and subordination, and
confirmed their own superiority and 'ideology of social distance"1. Universalism - one may
suggest - was indeed the particularism of the imperial colonisers, the way in which they
defined themselves: they not need ethnicity, or at least did not recognise it as such.1* Above
" Comaroff and Comaroff, From Revelation to Revolution, 11.
* C.Crais, 'Race, the State and the Silence of History in the Making of Modern South
Africa: preliminary departures', Africa Seminar, Centre for African Studies, University of
Cape Town, July, 1992, cited in M. Legassick, 'The state, racism and the rise of capitalism
in the nineteenth-century Cape Colony', South African Historical Review, no 28, May 1993.
336-7
" E. Elbourne, " T o colonize the mind": evangelical missionaries in Britain and the
eastern Cape, 1790-1837" (D. Phil. Oxford, 1991), 189. For the missionary 'construction
of the savage' see D. Stuart's forthcoming London Ph.D., '"Of heroes and savages':
discourses of race, nation and gender in the evangelical missions to southern Africa in the
early nineteenth century'.
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 Cf Stuart Hall: "One of the things which happens in England is the long discussion,
which is just beginning, to try to convince the English that they are, after all, just another
euinic group ....ethnicity, in the sense that this is that which speaks itself as if ir encompasses
II
all. Cape liberalism embodied the ideology of individualism, free irade and progress - wiih
a capital T \ the ethos of mid-nineteenth ceniury confidence and global expansion. What was
progress for the triumphant middle class had a rather different meaning for Uie underclasses
at home, however - to say nothing of the subjects of empire,"
Clearly then in Ihe 1990s we can no lunger hold the sanguine or singular a view of the role
of the 'enlightened' British at the Cape of an earlier generation of historians. At the same
lime, 'progress' in a colonial context meant 'self-government', And at the Cape - surely
remarkably in the context t>f 19th century empire - it did mean a degree of political equality
and non-racial government, even if it did not; could not mean social or economic equality.
As Stanley Trapido showed many years ago self government at the Cape was granted in
response to profound political upheaval at the Cape: partly a response to the European
revolutions of 1848 and bitter colonial opposition to British proposals to land convicts at the
Cape, which had rendered existing representative institutions unworkable, partly a response
to war and uprisings on ihe frontier wars, and a threatened insurrection among the Khoisan
in the western Cape. In the hopes of defusing uie discontent from colonists and insurgent
Coloured?, a low property, non-racial qualification for the franchise - lower indeed than
existed at that time in Britain - was granted." As the Cape Attorney General, William
Porter put it in a much quoted statement:
I would rather meet the Hottentot at Ihe hustings voting for his representative
everything within its range is. after all. a very specific and peculiar form of ethnic identity
... It is for a time the ethnicity which places all the other ethnicities, but nevertheless, it is
one in its own terms.' ('The Local and the Global: Globalization and Ethnicity', in King. ed.
Culture, Globalization and the World System. 21-2.)
" Several works shape my understanding: Martin Legassick's pioneering article. 'The
frontier tradition in South African historiography', Stanley Trapido's work on Cape liberalism
- both his original thesis on the subject and his more recent research on the Cape in the
Atlantic world: Clifton Crais and Noel Mostert's very different works on Uie Cape frontier;
Andre du Toit's fascinating account of 'the Cape Afrikaner's failed liberal moment' Elizabeth
Elbourne and Doug Stuart's recent doctoral theses on early I9lh century missionary
endeavour, Jean and John Comaroff's analysis of Christianity. Most of these have been cited
above.
* S . Trapido. 'Origins of the Cape franchise qualifications of 1853', Journal of African
HislQiy, V, I, 1964; see also Marks and Trapido, The Politics of Race. Class and
Rationalism in Twentieth century South Africa. (London and New York, 1987), 4-5. The
electoral qualifications included anyone who occupied property worth £25 or earned £50 in
wages.
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than meet the Hottentot in the wilds with a gun on his shoulder."
Perhaps more surprisingly, as Trapido also showed, the non-racial, low property
qualifications were supported hy an alliance of local humanitarians and missionaries - and
Afrikaners. Liberal values may initially have been a foreign transplant: by the mid-century,
they were beginning to take root. Indeed it in a less often-cited quotation, Porter reflected
also on this:
The English minority |he complained] affecting to be afraid of Dulch
preponderance, and whose strength might lie in the support of the Coloured
population, are found depriving the Coloured population of those privileges
which our liberal-hearted Dutchman holds forth with a free hand. I cannot
comprehend this. It seems to me suicide."
Andre du Toit refers to this as 'the brief and puzzling moment' of Afrikaner liberalism; he
sees no tradition of liberalism among Afrikaners, only a handful of unconnected individuals
who have 'to be understood in relation to wider social and political forces'." .Arguably,
however, the 'moment1 is longer than he suggests, and these individuals are no more
unconnected from their social base than their English-speaking counterparts." By the mid-
century, prominent Afrikaners were talking in the language of universal human rights, usually
regarded as the prerogative of British humanitarians. Thus in 1851, Christoffel Brand (whose
son was laster to become the president of the Orange Free State) roundly declared:
11
 Marks and Trapido, The Politics of Race Class qp4 Nationalism, P-5.
11
 Cited in A. du Toil. 'The Cape Afrikaners' failed liberal moment', in J. Butler, R.
Elphick and D. Welsh, eds., Democratic Liberalism jn South Africa. Jts history and prospect
(Middletown, Conn, and Cape Town and Johannesburg, 1987), p.45.
11
 du Toit, 'The Cape Afrikaners' failed liberal moment', 35.
M
 The individuals would certainly go back to H.C.D. Maynier the Company official on
the eastern frontier in 1790s who, Mostert says, 'marks the beginning of the moral debate
about the relations between whites and blacks in South Africa', and the complex Andries
Stockenstrom. The son of the Swedish tanddrost of Craaff Reinet who was killed in a frontier
skirmish in 1811, Stockenstrom rose to the highest official position on the eastern frontier.
Deeply involved with emancipation of the Khoisan and the slaves in the 1820s, and the treaty
system with African chiefs in the 1830s and 1840s, he nevertheless identified himself as an
Afrikaner. By the mid-19lh century, Stockenstrom had emerged as. one of the elected
members of the Cape's Legislative Council which advocated the surprisingly low property
qualification which would enfranchise large numbers of poorer Afrikaners in the western
Cape - but also, as they well knew, substantial numbers of the Coloured community. (For
Maynier, see Mostert, Fr.pntie.rs, 248. For Stockenstrom, see also Frontiers, passim). As
Martin Legassick has recently remarked. Stockenstrom is well overdue for a serious
biography. ('The state, racism and the rise of capitalism', 336.)
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"And gentlemen, why should Ipeople uf color) not be entitled to vote1.' Here
in Ihis municipality they enjoy the same privileges that we do. and what
inconvenience has ever arisen? ... These people pay their share of ihe taxes,
and why should they not have a voice in the appropriation of their own
money? ... Shall we withhold from them the same liberties we ourselves
enjoy? If we have the slightest idea of such a thing we would be unworthy of
having a free constitution.' "
Nor was this simply the discnurse of the urhan elite. From the rural constituency of
Clanwilliam, an Afrikaner delegation prepared an address to Ihe governor protesting at the
attempts by English-speaking merchants and officials to raise the franchise qualifications:
We are unwilling to conceal ... that we shudder at the idea of the distinction
made in the present Legislative Council between rich and poor, white and
coloured, contrary to her Majesty's decision, as contained in the draft
constitution ordinance |lhey declared|. We wish earnestly to impress |on you)
... that the abolition of the £25 franchise and the introduction of a £2000
qualification for the Legislative Council will affect the same civil right [sic|
which the coloured are as much entitled to enjoy as we, and would only give
to the rich the whole influence in the Legislature ... M
Now it is true that Afrikaners had a direct stake in a low electoral qualification; and that after
this, a degree of cynicism set in in relation to electoral politics in general, and the votes of
Coloureds, many of them tied farm workers, were frequently' determined by their white
masters. Nevertheless, in the 1870s, when the British set out its terms for the confederation
of South Africa, Cape opinion was outraged that it contained no provision fur a non-racial
franchise, and this included Afrikaner as well as English-speaking opinion; by the end of the
century, the veteran Cape politician John X Merriman could remark, "Habit has even made
some of those who are not enthusiastic advocates of the policy take a pride in the superior
liberality of the Cape Colony ... •" In 1890, when a delegate to the Congress of the major
Afrikaner political organisation, the Afrikaner Bond, proposed the removal of coloured men
from the voters' roll, the discussion ended when J.H. Neelhting asked rhetorically 'What
would be said throughout the world if it were known that on the 15 March 1890, the
" The Cape Mail 6 Dec 1851, ciled in du Toit, 'The Cape Afrikaners' failed moment',
p. 43.
* Cape Daily Mail. I April 1852, cited in du Toit, 45.
" Trapido, '"The friends of the natives"; merchants, peasants and political ideological
structure of liberalism in the Cape, 1854-1910', in Marks and Atmore, E£anojny_anj
SQcjeg.', 253-4; P. Lewsen: 'The Cape liberal tradition, myth or reality?' in Collected
Seminar Papers, no. 17, Th.e Safeties of Southern Africa vol. I (Institute of Commonwealth
Studies, London, 1970)
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Afrikaner Bond Conference passed a resolution such as this.'"
With the polarisation of Cape politics after the Jameson Raid, both English-speaking and
Afrikaner politiciaas began to woo the African vote, which determined the outcome of the
election in seven out of some sixty seats: anil after the war the Afrikaner Bond actually
invited the leading African of his day, J.T. Jahavu to stand as their candidate in
Kingwilliamstown although he declined to stand. In other words, the non-racial franchise had
come to define the identity of a substantial number of the Cane's populace. And, as Phyllis
Lewsen points out, this was in large measure a resull of the existence of iastitulions which
encouraged and entrenched non-racial attitudes to the franchise: yet this actually coincided
with the introduction of far more systematic social segregation in a variety of public
institutions in late I9th century Cape Town, as Vivian Bickford Smith and others have
shown."
There is thus no straightforward 'progressive' narrative of liberalism to he told; at the same
time, however, as the above has, 1 hope, indicated, any subversion of the 'grand narrative'
of the enlightenment has to be partial. However 'elusive, ambiguous, rickety and hypocritical
|the] structure"0 of 19th century Cape liberalism, or mission Christianity, may have been,
the universalism of its language - and the spaces which its ambiguities left open -enabled its
contestation if not its capture by colonial subjects, whether white or black.
As Elizabeth Elboume has remarked of 19th century mission Christianity, the value of
mission Christianity for early converts was the malleability of Christian language and the
universalism and inclusiveness of its message; these opened up real possibilities for
contestations over meaning." And this was true also of 'the universalism1 of "the Cape
liberal tradition'. Nor did the limitations in practice necessarily invalidate the rhetoric, even
if inequalities in power ultimately determined the outcome.
Here 1 follow Ernesto Laclau has recently remarked, 'it is one thing to say that the
universalistic values of the West are the preserve of its traditional dominant groups; a very
different one is to assert that the historical link between the two is a contingent and
unacceptable fact which can he modified through political and social struggles.' He cites an
example which I believe would have interested Eleanor Ralhbone: in the wake of the French
" Cited in S. Trapido, "The friends of the natives'", 268.
* Lewsen, 'The Cape liberal tradition'; for increased 'systematic' segregation, see
especially V. Bickford Smith, 'Commerce, class and ethnicity in cape Town, 1875-1902',
Ph.D. Cambridge, 1988, and his 'The background to apartheid in Cape Town: the growth
of racism and segregation from the mineral revolution to the 1930s', paper presented to the
History Workshop, University of Witwatersrand, 1990.
* I owe this wholly appropriate phrase to J. Peires, 'Pinning the Tail on the Donkey',
South African Historical Journal. 28 (19930, 321.
" Elboume, '"To colonise the mind". See especially the introduction.
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Revolution, when Mary Wollstonecruft was defending the rights or women she did not
present the exclusion of women from the 'Declaration of the Rights of Man' and citizenship
as a proof that the latter are intrinsically male rights, hul tried, on the contrary, to deepen Ihe
democratic revolution by showing the incoherence of establishing universal rights which were
restricted to particular sectors of the population ...'*' And the same could be said of black
colonial subjects who were demanding their incorporation into civil society by the late
nineteenth century.
Whatever the controlling purpose and ambiguities of the incorporationist stralegy, then, for
the black elite it opened up political opportunity and real material benefits. The expansion
of Christianity and mission education had led by the last quarter of the nineteenth century to
the emergence of a clearly defined group of Africans who identified themselves with liberal
values. Although the spate of wars of conquest in the late 1870s placed strains on their
aspirations, and the extent to which they accepted the norms of imperial hegemony has been
exaggerated, their response to these tensions was in part to make use of the electoral
machinery provided by the Cape government, in part to use the universalist discourse of
imperialism to contest the increasingly racist measures being proposed in the last decades of
the century as the earlier alliance which had buttressed the non-racial franchise was
undermined by the rise of mining capital with social dislocations and insecurities and its
demands for huge quantities of cheap, rightless black labour.
Out of the many possible quotations to illustrate these assertion, I have chosen - because il
is after all International Women's Day - an editorial by Sol T. Plaatje, the African
intellectual, writer and journalist who translated Shakespeare into his own tongue, SeLswana,
and SeLswana proverbs into English, and who went on to become the first General Secretary
of the ANC:
We do not hanker after social equality with the white man. If anyone tells you
that we do so, he is a lunatic ... The renegade Kafir who desires to court and
marry your daughter is a perfect danger to his race, for if his yearnings were
realised we would be hurrying along to ... the total.obliteration of our race
and colour ...
All we claim is our just dues; we ask for our political recognition as loyal
British subjects .... Under the Union Jack every person is his neighbour's
equal, there are certain regulations for which one should qualify before his
legal status is recognised as such: to this qualification race or colour is no bar.
and we hope, in the near future, to record that one's sex will, no longer, debar
her from exercising a privilege hitherto enjoyed by the sterner sex only."
'Equal rights for all civilised men, equality of opportunity, equality before the law' - indeed
perhaps even 'equal rights for all civilised women ...' - these were the elements of the
" E. Laclau, 'Political frontiers, identification and political identities', paper presenied
to the conference on 'Nationalism, ethnicity and identity", Grahamstown, April 1993.
" In Koranta ea Becoana. 13 Sept 1902, cited in B. Willan, Sol PiwttJC. 5wft African
nationalist 1876-1932 (London. 1984). 111.
16
political creed imbibed by Plaatje and his fellows in the Cape; ihey were increasingly coming
under fire at the end of the century in the Cape."
By the twentieth century, then, the Cape liberal 'thread' in my non-racist tapestry had rather
changed its colour: in the context of an industrialising South Africa, it was becoming an
increasing Mack thread, whilst among the relatively 'small circle of white educationalists,
missionaries and social workers"- who still saw themselves as liberal the thread had indeed
become 'rather thin'. Increasing numbers of people who regarded themselves as 'friends of
the natives' came to argue for segregation - either total separation or the establishment of
parallel institutions -as the best way of defending African interests, and defusing potential
class and racial conflict: this indeed was , as Sir Keith Hancock pointed out, 'the liberal
orthodoxy'.*6
It is true that by the late 1930s a number had withdrawn from this outright segregation,
confronted as they were by its manifestly repressive nature, and there were always notable
exceptions. " Old-style Cape liberals, for example, continued to defend the franchise and
bitterly opposed the removal of Africans from the common roll in 1936, but a mere ten MPs
- led by J.H. Hofmeyr - opposed the removal of Cape Africans from the common roll in
" W i i i a n , S o L E l a a t e , I I I .
" This is Paul Rich's description of who the 20th century white liberals were: see his
White Power and the Liberal Conscience. Racial segregation and South African liberalism.
122JJ9iQ (Manchester, 1984), I.
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 In the first half century, liberalism was expressed through the South African Institute
of Race Relations and the Joint Council movement. Yet according to Paul Rich, by following
a policy of factual research devoid of political comment the Institute may have strengthened
the conservative element in South African liberalism. He maintains that 'by the early 1930s,
a new ideological consensus began to be formed between the more conservative intelligentsia
centred around the Institute of Race Relations and the government policy of trusteeship'. Thus
in many ways the story of mainstream liberalism in the first half of the 20th century South
Africa has been even more ambiguous if not compromised than its 19th century precursor.
" Like, for example, the social historian, W.M. Macmillan, who appears to have been
radicalised by his encounters with Africans in die Joint Council movement which had been
formed as a meeting place for educated Africans and sympathetic whites. Macmillan quickly
saw the dangers of the segregationism being advocated by the founders of the South African
Institute of Race Relations: by the early 1930s however he had left South Africa, alienated
by the entire trend of government and indeed liberal politics. For Macmillan, see the essays
in H. Macmillan and S. Marks, ed. Africa and Empire. W.M. Macmillan, Ifotnrian and
Social Critic (London, 1989), especially chapter 2, H. Macmillan, '"Paralyzed
Conservatives": W.M. Macmillan, the social scientists and the "Common Society", 1923-48'.
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1936; they were noi supported by that world stalesman, General Smuts." Yet as Janet
Robertson remarks in her essentially sympathetic study of South African liberalism even J.H,
Hofmeyr, long the hope of the liberals within Smuts's United Party, was 'sufficiently the
product of his own white world to delay as long as possible any open break with the United
Party .... On almost every crucial occasion he took the line of least resistance."*
When after Hofmeyr's death the Liberal Party was eventually formed (in 1953), Z.K.
Matthews, one of the most 'consistently moderate' of the Congress leaders was lo write:
the question is whether they (the Liberals| have enough strength and enough
ability to overcome the reluctance of the average liberal white South African
to work wjlh. instead of foil the African."1
Had 1 time lo fully weave this tapestry of threads, the many threads of liberal conscience in
South Africa since then would need to he woven in here. Since the 1930s, white liberals have
undoubtedly borne witness to moral conscience; in the darkest days of apartheid they refused
to remain silent. I think here of the indomitable Mrs Helen Suzm'an and her endless
questions in parliament and activities on behalf of political prisoners and others, of the
extraordinary women of the Black Sash who initially took their stand over purely
constitutional issues and came to tackle the far wider range of social oppressions, of the
handful of lawyers and judges and doctors who exposed torture and grotesque illegalities;
of the churchmen who consistently raised their voices against .social injustice; of the students
both in NUSAS and in the Wage Commissions who first began to raise the issue of black
wages in the late 1960s, even if it is not entirely clear that they have been able to work 'with'
rather than 'for' Africans. Suzman's Progressive Party for example only accepted the notion
of a universal non-racial franchise in 1978, and both the Liberal Party and the later
progressives in their various guises found it difficult to identify fully with the struggles for
W J . Robertson. Liberalism in South Africa. 1948-1963 (Oxford. 1971)^11.
* Ibid. 28.
w
 Cited in Robertson, Liberalism, in South Africa. 118. Cf Nelson Mandela writing at
much the same time:
In South Africa, where the entire population is almost split into two hostile
camps in consequence of the policy of racial discrimination, and where recent
political events have made the struggle between oppressor and oppressed more
acute, there can he no middle course. The fault of the Liberals ... is to
attempt to strike just such a course. They believe in criticising and
condemning the government for its reactionary policies, hut they are afraid to
identify themselves with the people and to assume the task of mobilising that
social force capable of lifting the struggle to higher levels. ('The shifting sands
of illusion' in Liberation. June 1953, cited in S. Johns and R. Hunt Davis, Jr.,
Mandela Tamho aqd the African National Congress. The slroedejigajnsi
apartheid. 1948-1990. A thicumentarv survey (New York and oxford, 1991),
40.
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black liberation, whatever the stance of individual liberals.
What then of the 'non-racism' of the liberation movements? Here I have only time to talk
about the ANC, which was founded in 1912. and which for most of this century has been ihe
main black political organisation. From the very outset, the South African Native National
Congress (as it then was) saw its goat
in forging a pan-ethnic African nationalism. Given its pan-South African character and its
numerical weakness perhaps it could hardly do otherwise." Moreover even in the first
decade of the century, in the protests against the exclusive nature of the Union constitution,
Coloured and African leaders had come together - a prospect of unity which was periodically
to haunt the white rulers of South Africa. In 1937 Ralph Bundle noted how in the
discussions over the name for the recently formed National Council of African Women, 'One
speaker from the Cape made an appeal for keeping the doors open to all non-European
women and was glad the term African instead of Bantu was adopted in the name of Ihe
organization1." The incorporationist ethic of African societies and the fluidity of ethnic
boundaries among Africans may well have facilitated this.
The middle-class male elite that dominated the ANC was remarkably tolerant at Ihis stage -
and for much longer - of white paternalism. There was no suggestion that whites become
members of the ANC, however. To raise the question is in a sense to show how unthinkable
it was to both sides by the early 20th century ... despite the sympathetic assistance which
Congress received from a handful of whites like Harriette Colenso (daughter of the famous
Bishop of Natal) who was one of the first to see Ihe significance of its formation of the
SANNC."
" Among the objectives of the first constitution of the SANNC in September 1919
contained two clauses advocating a pan-tribal organisation:
... To encourage mutual understanding and to bring together into common
action as one political people all tribes and clans of various tribes or races
and by means of combined effort and united political organisation to defend
their freedom, rights and privileges;
... To discourage and contend against racialism and tribal feuds; jealousy and
petty quarrels by economic combination, education, goodwill and by other
means.
<T. Karis and G.M. Carter, From Protest to Challenge. A documentary history of African
politics in South Africa. 1882-1964 (4 vols. Stanford, Ca. 1972-1977), vol. I, 177.
" An African American in South Africa. The travel notes of Ralph I Bunche. 28
September 1937-1 January 1938 ed. by R. R. Edgar (Athens, Ohio and Johannesburg,
1992), 278.
" See my 'Harriette Colenso and the Zulus, 1874-1913', Journal of African history.
vol.4, no.3, 1963.
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(Had I the time I would like to have woven another thread into this tapestry - a female
rainbow strand which would lead - albeit in broken and somewhat eccentric fashion - from
Harriette Colenso, Olive Schreiner, Margaret Ballinger, Ray Alexander, Betty du Toit and.
Ruth First, to the Black Sash and Helen Suzman on the while side, through Josie Pama,
Charlotte Maxexe, Sihusisiwe Makanya, Lilian Ngoya, Albertina Sisulu and Frene Ginwala
on the black. But this story will have to await another lime . . . "
For the black men who founded Congress, however, what had to he overcome was the
'racism' between the different 'tribal groups" of South Africa, not the division between while
and black. Indeed in the late 1910s and 1920s important members of Congress, (sometimes
under the influence of the radical movement of the Jamaican Marcus Garvey, sometimes of
the more conservative American ex-slave Booker T. Washington) were prepared to entertain
ideas of segregation between black and white, provided the division of South Africa were on
a more equal basis.
Nevertheless, to counter the racial policies of the newly unified settler state, African
nationalism was to develop a broad non-racial nationalism that was to be very different in its
implications for (he future of South Africa. The racially exclusive nature of the South
African state meant that they could not win power through the ballot box, or through an
appeal to an exclusive ethnic group. For the new elite of western educated Africans,
excluded from the body politic at union, it was therefore older African and imperial notions
of incorporation premised on an alliance with whites, that permeated political thought.
Their claim was for incorporation in a unitary, non-racial, democratic state: at most the
demands of social democracy. Nevertheless, as they found their attempts in the first fifty
years of this century at even limited incorporation rejected, middle-class leaders were
radicalised. Their structural vulnerability and the intimacy forged by their shared racial
oppression meant -thai there have always been significant sections of the African petty
bourgeoisie that were open to more radical ideas, whether from the African militant
opposition of the nineteenth century, left-wing intellectuals, both socialist and communist, or
American Garveyites."
Thus the relationship between African nationalism and the left -very much part of South
Africa's contemporary politics • is an extremely important thread in the non-racial tradition
in South Africa - indeed there are some who see this as the most enduring/endearing aspect
of the contribution of the South African Communist Party to South Africa's tortured political
inheritance. Nevertheless even this has not been without its contradictions, and tensions: on
iKrth sides. This too has been a somewhat knobbly thread. From its foundation in 1921, the
Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) was frequently hostile to what it saw as the
bourgeois nationalism of the ANC, while its 'tradition' of non racism was often ambivalent.
•" The listis. of course, far from comprehensive and could be far longer.
" For these influences, see Marks and Trapido. eds. The Politics of Race. Class and
National ism,, especially the essay by Ptrio and Hill and the introduction.
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Initially many white communists preferred not to emphasize the interest or black workers in
the party 'lest they prejudice the work of the party among the segregationist white workers',
whom they saw at least until the late 1920s as the 'vanguard of the revolution'. Until the
1930s non-racism was associated with specific individuals, with Cape Town traditionally more
concerned with questions of black - African and Coloured - workers."
Although for a brief period in the late 1920s these suspicions were overcome, and through
the 1930s the Party itself came to have a majority of black members, many of whom had a
dual membership, considerable tension remained. This was particularly marked in the
1940s when the ANC itself was divided 'between those who advocated a more inclusive
nonracial nationalism and those who argued for an exclusively African nationalism'."
Nevertheless, the prolonged campaigns against state policies in the 1950s, with allies from
all racial groups including white progressives and the outlawed Communist Party, the banning
of black nationalist organisations in 1960, and the decisions to go underground and engage
in sabotage and armed struggle all sharpened the radicalism and intensified the commitment
to a non-racial South Africa of the Congress movement. This common engagement
culminated in the Freedom Charter in which the ANC resolved that the liberation of South
Africa was the task of all genuine democrats regardless of race and that - to quote the
Freedom Charter 'South Africa belonged to all who lived in it'."
This was no easy decision. It is sometimes alleged that the non-racialism of the ANC is
purely instrumental and designed for outside consumption; even more cynically, it has been
suggested to me that it is merely a way in which whites are able to script themselves into the
liberation struggle in South Africa. White there was undoubtedly a pragmatism involved
especially in the 1950s when alliance with other racial groups made good political but also
material sense, I believe it goes far beyond this. Not only did non-racism lose the ANC
support among blacks in the USA and Africa, who found its non-racial stance difficult to
understand, and from western conservatives who objected to their alliance with white
radicals; it also had to defend its position against the challenge of the Africanists and the
later Black Consciousness movement. So much so that Eddie Daniels records that in 1979
fighting broke out on Robben Island between the ANC and the 'strong anti-white element'
among the prisoners who came in after 1976: a number of the ANC prisoners were stabbed
and hurt in the fracas." Many of these Black Consciousness activists were persuaded 'to
w
 S. W. Johns III, 'Marxism-Leninism in a multi-racial environment: the origins and early
history of the Communist Party of South Africa, 1914-1932' (Ph.D. Harvard, 1965), 310.
" Johns and Hunt Davis, Jr. Mandela and. Tambo, 18.
" For the Freedom Charter passed at the Congress of the People, KJiptown
(Johannesburg) 25th and 26th June, 1955, see Carter and Karis, From Protest to Challenge.
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follow Mandela and non racialism' on the Island."
The extent to which this ideology had come to replace black consciousness - the result in part
of the work also or while radicals in the resurgent trade union movement of the 1970s can
be seen from the open display of ANC colours at the funeral of Dr Neil Aggett, the white
doctor and trade unionist who was the first white to die in detention, and the work stoppage
of over 200,000 black trade unionists to mark the occasion.
Of course the process has not been unprublemalic: the tensions in Natal between Africans and
Indians which manifested in ugly race riots in 1949 and more recently in Inanda in I98S; the
breakaway of the Afhcanists from the ANC to form the Pan Afticanist Congress in 1969; the
rise of ethnic nationalisms in the state-created Bantustans; and the utter ruthlessness with
which the far-right white-black alliance is prepared to go in destabilising the country and
rendering the possibilities of even reasonably free and fair elections problematic forbid any
easy optimism.
Moreover, as I hinted at the beginning whether - and how long -the non-racism of the ANC
can outlast the difficulties of a post-apartheid South Africa is also far from clear. As in the
nineteenth century Cape, it would seem that for the ANC at least non-racism has become a
'habit of mind': as an ANC leader in the Transvaal recently pronounced - 'We would not be
ANC if were not non-racist.' Nevertheless, if we look back on this complex history of non-
racism in South Africa - as well as the resurgence of racism internationally - the threads
remain eminently breakable. Indeed some are already beginning to fray. A beleaguered state.
the heir to massive black-white inequalities and limited resources in an unpropitious
international economic climate, is going to Hud non-racism far more difficult in the face of
the demands of its followers for redistribution and positive discrimination. Much will depend
on the resources available, and the institutions set up to distribute them. Nevertheless, the
renewed hegemony of ideals of non-racialism and pan-tribalism in a country which seen more
than a century of the entrenchment of racial separation and racial privilege and the
manipulation of ethnicity on an unprecedented scale is surely remarkable and remains truly
inspirational.
Seth Mazuhuko, account in Newsweek. 23 June 1986, cited in Ibid. 160.
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